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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES
FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS
John T Ell ft
On March 7, 1983, Attorney General William French Smith issued
new guidelines for FBI investigations in the areas of domestic security,
racketeering enterprise, and general crimes.' They replaced previous
guidelines for FBI domestic security investigations issued in 1976 by At-
torney General Edward H. Levi2 and guidelines for FBI racketeering
enterprise and general crimes investigations issued in 1980 by Attorney
General Benjamin R. Civiletti.3
The Smith guidelines made significant changes in the standards for
domestic security investigations. This article examines the first amend-
ment implications of the new guidelines, giving particular attention to
two issues. First, whether the Smith guidelines increase the likelihood
that FBI investigations will impair the constitutional rights to protest
and dissent; and second, whether the Smith guidelines provide adequate
safeguards against FBI monitoring of lawful political expression and as-
sociation. In addition to analyzing the Smith and Levi guidelines, the
article interprets the Civiletti guidelines and the FBI charter legislation
proposed in 1979.4 The similarity between the Smith guidelines and the
1979 FBI charter proposal is striking. Although Congress has not con-
sidered an FBI charter since 1980, similarity between the Smith guide-
lines and his predecessor's charter proposal suggests a consensus on the
t B.A. 1963, DePauw University; Ph.D. in political science 1968, Harvard University;
Associate Professor of Politics, Brandeis University, 1971-1976; Domestic Intelligence Task
Force Leader, Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 1975-1976; Profes-
sional Staff Member, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, 1977-present. This arti-
cle represents the views of the author and does not reflect views of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence or any member thereof.
1 The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and
Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 7, 1983), issued as Department of Justice
Press Release, March 7, 1983 [hereinafter cited as Smith Guidelines].
2 The Attorney General's Guidelines on Domestic Security Investigations (Apr. 5,
1976), reprinted in FBI Statutog Charter: Hearings on S 1612 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudici-
a0y, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-26 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Levi Guidelines].
3 The Attorney General's Guidelines on Criminal Investigations of Individuals and Or-
ganizations (Dec. 2, 1980), reprinted in FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY
UNDERCOVER ACTIvrrIES OF COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO THE U.S.
SENATE, S. REP. No. 682, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 504-16 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Civiletti
Guidelines].
4 S. 1612, The Federal Bureau of Investigation Charter Act of 1979, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1979), reprinted in FBI Charter Act of 1979 Hearings on S 1612 Before the Senate Comm. on
theJudiciagi, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 427 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FBI Charter Bill].
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proper role of the FBI. The unanimous report of the Senate Select
Committee that investigated the FBI's ABSCAM operation in 1982 fo-
cused on FBI undercover operations, but stressed the need for legislative
standards governing the FBI generally.5 Thus, a careful examination of
the Smith guidelines is important to assess their role as a model for legis-
lation, as well as to determine their effect on first amendment rights.
I
THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES
In the absence of an explicit legislative charter, the FBI derives its
statutory mandate primarily from the Attorney General's authority to
appoint officials:
(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States;
(2) to assist in the protection of the person of the President; and
(3) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters
under the control of the Department ofJustice and the Department of
State as may be directed by the Attorney General.6
The Attorney General's guidelines establish standards and procedures
for FBI investigations conducted under this broad statutory authority,
as well as pursuant to claims of presidential power to order investiga-
tions without statutory authorization. Two background points are im-
portant in examining the Smith guidelines. First, the guidelines are not
enforceable in court, except to the extent that they incorporate separate
judicially enforceable legal standards. Second, there are other Attorney
General's guidelines that regulate particular investigative techniques
and that authorize FBI foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
activities.
A. Enforceability of the Guidelines
Despite limitations on their direct judicial enforcement, the Attor-
ney General's guidelines should play a role in the protection of citizens'
constitutional rights against improper governmental investigation. In-
deed, the Levi guidelines were instrumental in the settlement of one
such judicial proceeding. 7 Constitutional adjudication of domestic se-
curity investigations requires accomodating law enforcement interests
with the constitutional rights of individuals who represent vague or po-
tential threats to the government. The absence of specific guidelines to
control governmental overreaching may lead courts to find that domes-
5 FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY UNDERCOVER AcrivrriEs OF
COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO THE U.S. SENATE, S. REP. No. 682, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 25-29, 347-97 (1982) [hereinafter cited as UNDERCOVER AcTivITIEs
REPORT].
6 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1976).
7 See infra notes 15-20 and 110-19 and accompanying text.
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tic security investigations unduly chill the exercise of constitutional
rights. Given this situation, the Smith guidelines could play a role both
in regulating FBI investigatory activity and in offering the courts gui-
dance in reviewing claims of improper governmental investigations.
The final section of the Smith guidelines describes their limited le-
gal effect as a statement of policy "solely for the purpose of internal
Department of Justice guidance."8 The language is unequivocal:
They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to cre-
ate any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any
party in any manner, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limita-
tion on otherwise lawful investigative and litigative prerogatives of
the Department of Justice.9
The Civiletti guidelines issued in 1980 contained an identical state-
ment.' 0 Although the Levi guidelines contained no such language, the
1979 FBI charter bill expressly barred judicial enforcement of either the
proposed statutory standards or the Attorney General's guidelines that
the bill required for FBI investigations."I These provisions in the guide-
lines and the charter bill parallel the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Caceres, 12 where the Court held that technical violations of Inter-
nal Revenue Service guidelines for undercover investigations should not
lead to reversal of a conviction on either due process or statutory
grounds.' 3
8 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § VII.C.
9 Id
10 Civiletti Guidelines, supra note 3, § IV.B.
1 FBI Charter Bill, supra note 4. Section 537a of the bill provided:
(a) No CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST UNITED STATES.-Nothing in
this chapter creates a civil cause of action against the United States not avail-
able under other provisions of this title, or a civil cause of action against any
officer, agent, or employee or former officer, agent, or employee of the United
States Government not otherwise available at law.
(b) EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FOLLOW THIS CHAPTER, GUIDELINES, OR
PROCEDURE.-Nothing in this chapter, or in any guidelines or procedures
established pursuant to this chapter, creates any substantive or procedural
right and no court has jurisdiction over a claim in any proceeding, including
a motion to quash a subpoena, suppress evidence, or dismiss an indictment,
based solely on an alleged failure to follow a provision of this chapter or of
guidelines or procedures established pursuant to this chapter.
FBI Charter Bill, supra note 4, at 44, reprinted in Hearings on S. 1612 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciag, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 470. Section 537 of the FBI Charter Bill would have
authorized the FBI Director to impose a civil penalty of up to $5,000 on any FBI employee
who intentionally used "sensitive investigative techniques" in knowing violation of the char-
ter. Id at 43, reprinted in Hearings on S. 1612 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciao, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 469. These techniques, described in § 533b, id. at 14-25, reprinted in Hear-
ings on S. 1612 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiiag, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 440-51,
included the use of informants or undercover agents, physical surveillance, mail surveillance,
electronic surveillance, investigative demand for records, trash covers, pretext interviews, and
covert photographic surveillance.
12 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
13 Md at 749-50. The Court stated that the "duty to enforce an agency regulation is most
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Alternatives to judicial enforcement of the guidelines include inter-
nal disciplinary procedures and congressional oversight actions. Unfor-
tunately, nothing in any of the FBI guidelines suggests the types of
disciplinary penalties to be imposed for violations, although the charter
bill would have authorized the FBI Director to impose a civil penalty
for certain violations. 14
Despite the Smith guidelines' express limitation as to their legal ef-
fect, in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 15 the government
agreed to judicial enforcement of the Attorney General's guidelines as
part of a settlement. The Alliance plaintiffs challenged pre-1976 FBI ac-
tivities in Chicago. As part of the settlement agreement, the parties set
forth certain "general principles"'16 to govern FBI domestic security in-
vestigations and incorporated the Attorney General's guidelines for such
investigations. The 1981 agreement recognized that the Levi guidelines
might be superseded and directed that new guidelines become part of
the settlement so long as the new guidelines conformed to the agree-
ment's general principles.17 Under the agreement, members of the
plaintiff class-which includes, among others, citizens residing in Chi-
cago at the time of the settlement-may petition the United States Dis-
trict Court for a finding that the terms of the agreement, including the
provisions of the Attorney General's guidelines, have been violated. 18 If
the court finds "'reasonable grounds' to believe that a violation has oc-
curred or is occuring," the court may permit discovery to rule "on
whether the activities in question are lawful, and [enter] an appropriate
remedial order."'19 As discussed below, 20 the Chicago settlement pro-
vided the first avenue for testing the Smith guidelines in court.
Absent such consent by the government, the guidelines are judi-
cially enforceable only insofar as they incorporate independent constitu-
tional or statutory requirements, an area of protection that the Supreme
Court has interpreted narrowly. 2' The Court held in Laird v. Tatum, 22
that mere collection of information about constitutionally protected
political activities does not give rise to a justiciable issue.23 Although
evident when compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution or federal
law." Id at 749. The Court went on to state that "the agency was not required by the
Constitution or by statute to adopt any particular procedures or rules before engaging in
consensual monitoring and recording." Id at 749-50.
14 See supra note 11.
15 561 F. Supp. 575 (19 83), enforcing 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
16 561 F. Supp. at 583.
17 Id at 584.
18 91 F.R.D. at 200.
19 Id
20 See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
22 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (5-4 decision).
23 Id at 10. The plaintiffs in Laird contended that an Army program to investigate civil
disturbances chilled their first amendment rights, and that the Army's program was broader
[Vol. 69:785
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judicially enforceable fourth amendment standards govern the most in-
trusive search and surveillance techniques, the Court has not extended
constitutional restrictions to the most common investigative methods
such as the use of informants24 and examination of financial records.25
In addition, some techniques are restricted by statutes with express judi-
cial enforcement provisions, such as the Right to Financial Privacy Act
of 1978.26 Statutory restrictions also generally overlap fourth amend-
ment requirements for nonconsensual electronic surveillance, mail open-
ing, and physical search.27
For techniques covered by judicially enforceable constitutional re-
strictions, the Court has indicated that the standards may vary accord-
ing to the governmental interests at stake. In United States v. United States
District Court, 28 the Court ruled that the fourth amendment requires a
judicial warrant for domestic security electronic surveillance not involv-
ing foreign powers or their agents. The Court suggested, however, that
fourth amendment standards might permit issuance of a warrant for
domestic security purposes without meeting all the requirements ordi-
narily applicable in criminal investigations. Justice Powell's opinion
stated that, because domestic security intelligence gathering often in-
volves investigation from various sources over an extended period of
time the "focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that
directed against more conventional types of crime."'29 Nevertheless, Jus-
tice Powell recognized that national security cases "often reflect a con-
vergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of
'ordinary' crimes."30 Noting the "danger of abuse" due to "the diffi-
culty of defining the domestic security interest," Powell warned that,
"[t]he price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to
an unchecked surveillance power. '"31 The Smith guidelines quote Jus-
than the Army's reasonable needs. Id The Court found that there was an insufficient chil-
ling effect and that the Army's program did not subject the complainant to "regulations,
proscriptions, or compulsions." Id at 11.
24 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300-01, 310-11 (1966) (presence of informer
in defendant's hotel room not fourth amendment search; use of government informers not due
process violation); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (no privacy right invaded
by use of "wired" undercover police agent).
25 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (no fourth amendment pri-
vacy right to protect depositor's bank records from governmental examination).
26 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982).
27 Eg., 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1982) (searches without warrant); id §§ 2510-2520 (electronic
surveillance for law enforcement purposes); 39 U.S.C. § 3623 (1976) (mail opening without
warrant); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. V 1981).
28 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972).
29 Id at 322.
30 Id at 313.
31 Id at 314. Justice Powell suggested that Congress revise title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982), which imposes a
strict probable cause standard for electronic surveillance. Id at 322-23. Powell went on to
state that the standards for domestic security investigations should be different than those for
1984]
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tice Powell's analysis as part of the description of FBI criminal intelli-
gence investigations.3 2
Rarely have the courts relied solely on first amendment grounds to
limit investigative methods. In prior cases, the courts have limited in-
vestigations that were conducted pursuant to overbroad internal stan-
dards. The Smith guidelines may play a similar role in future
constitutional adjudication. The leading case in the area, Paton v.
LaPrade,3 3 involved mail covers.3 4 Although courts have held that the
fourth amendment does not require a warrant for mail covers,35 in Paton
the Court found a postal service regulation that permitted mail covers to
protect national security unconstitutional as overbroad and "chilling"
on first amendment grounds.3 6 In Paton, through use of a mail cover,
the FBI identified a high school student who had written to the Socialist
Workers Party, and then conducted routine interviews to determine the
reason for the student's interest in the organization. Attorney General
Levi terminated the investigation in 1976. Subsequent to the Court's
decision in Paton, the Postal Service issued new regulations that confined
"national security" mail covers to foreign counterintelligence investiga-
tions involving foreign powers or their agents.3 7 The regulations permit-
ted mail covers for domestic security purposes only under the procedures
for ordinary criminal investigations aimed at obtaining evidence of the
commission or attempted commission of a crime.
The Paton case illustrates how the courts may place first amend-
ment limits on FBI investigative activities when the internal standards
for use of certain techniques are so permissive as to allow intrusion into
areas protected by the first amendment. Other cases indicate that fed-
general crimes. Id To date, Congress has not accepted the invitation. Congress has, how-
ever, enacted more flexible probable cause standards for electronic surveillance conducted for
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. III
1979)).
32 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § III.
33 469 F. Supp. 773 (D.N.J. 1978).
34 Mail cover is the examination and recording of information found on the outside
cover of mail. 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(c)(1) (1983).
35 See United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 173-80 (9th Cir. 1978).
36 469 F. Supp. at 782.
37 39 C.F.R. § 233.3 (1983). In explaining the new mail cover regulation, the Postal
Service distinguished between two types of investigations:
(1) "domestic" national security investigations, conducted by the FBI, aimed
at detecting terrorism, violence, or certain other activities conducted by do-
mestic groups not believed to be acting under the control or at the instigation
of a foreign power; ana,
(2) "foreign" counterintelligence investigations, conducted by the counter-
intelligence components of the F.B.I. or the Department of Defense, aimed at
detecting and taking countermeasures against espionage, terrorism, or other
activities perpetrated by a hostile foreign power through its agents.
44 Fed. Reg. 49,688 (1979) (emphasis in original). The new regulation authorized "national
security" mail covers only for the second type of investigation. 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(c)(5)(1983).
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eral courts are willing to find a justiciable first amendment issue when
the FBI employs techniques such as the use of informants or undercover
agents to infiltrate an organization engaged in constitutionally pro-
tected political activities.38 Thus, even though the FBI guidelines are
not themselves judicially enforceable, their provisions bear directly on
issues of overbreadth and "chilling effect," which the courts may adjudi-
cate on constitutional grounds.
B. Scope of the Smith Guidelines
Although the Smith guidelines profess to "provide guidance for all
investigations by the FBI of crimes and crime-related activities, '3 9 they
do not regulate the use of specific techniques in a detailed manner. For
example, in 1980 Attorney General Civiletti issued guidelines for the
FBI's use of informants and undercover operations,40 superseding the
earlier Levi guidelines on FBI informants. The Smith guidelines, in
turn, adopted the undercover and informant provisions of the Civiletti
guidelines that address first amendment concerns. Other guidelines on
specific techniques apply to all investigative components of the Depart-
ment of Justice. For example, Department policy guidelines prescribe
advance authorization requirements for consensual electronic monitor-
ing; and guidelines issued pursuant to title II of the Privacy Protection
Act of 1980 restrict the use of search warrants to obtain materials from
disinterested third parties.41
Some guidelines are beyond public scrutiny. For example, Attor-
ney General Levi and his successors have classified the guidelines for
FBI investigations involving foreign intelligence, foreign counterintel-
ligence, and international terrorism. Executive Order 12,333 authorizes
FBI investigations of this type and requires that they be conducted in
accordance with procedures established by the Attorney General.42 Ac-
38 See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 510 F.2d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 1974)
(value of freedom of association justified enjoining transmission to Civil Service Commission
of names of participants in Young Socialist convention); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349
F. Supp. 766, 770-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Bill of Rights protects against use of informers to
interfere with, rather than monitor, first amendment activities).
39 Smith Guidelines, supra note I.
40 The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Use of Informants and Confidential
Sources (Dec. 2, 1980), reprinted in UNDERCOVER ACTIVITIES REPORT, supra note 5, at 517-30;
The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations (Dec. 31, 1980), repintedin
UNDERCOVER ACTIVITIES REPORT, supra note 5, at 536-55.
41 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § IV.B.6 (advance authorization requirements); 28
C.F.R. § 59.4 (1983) (procedures relating to use of search warrants in obtaining materials
from a "disinterested third party").
42 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981). Section 1.14(a) of the order
authorizes the FBI to conduct and coordinate "counterintelligence activities" and § 1.14(c) to
"collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other
agencies within the Intelligence Community." The term "counterintelligence" is defined in
§ 3.4(a) of the order to mean "information gathered and activities conducted to protect
1984]
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cording to FBI Director Webster, the largest number of FBI terrorism
investigations in 1982 fell "under the category of international terror-
ism," which included "groups who act on behalf of a foreign power or
whose activities transcend national boundaries. '43 Although the follow-
ing analysis concentrates on FBI law enforcement guidelines, the classi-
fied foreign intelligence and counterintelligence guidelines may raise
similar issues.4 Any consideration of constitutional or legislative stan-
dards for FBI investigations also must consider this area of the FBI's
responsibilities. 45
II
FROM INTERNAL SECURITY TO CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE
The implications of the Smith guidelines depend more on the un-
derlying policy orientation of the FBI and the Justice Department than
on the precise language used to set investigative standards.4 6 The cur-
rent guidelines reflect a significant shift from the FBI's pre-1976 internal
security policies to a concept of criminal intelligence tied directly to law
enforcement functions. Any consideration of legislative or constitutional
issues raised by the Smith guidelines should take into account the devel-
opment of a substantially new definition of the FBI's domestic security
role.
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on
behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not
including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs." The term
"foreign intelligence" is defined in § 3.4(d) to mean "information relating to the capabilities,
intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including
counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities." Section 2.3 of
the order requires that collection of information concerning "United States persons" be un-
dertaken in accordance with procedures approved by the Attorney General.
43 Domestic Security (Levi) Guidelines; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrism of
the Senate Comm. on theJudiciaq, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982) (testimony of William H. Web-
ster, Director, FBI) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Senate Hearings].
44 Such issues were discussed at hearings on charter legislation for the U.S. intelligence
community in 1978 and 1980. National Intelligence Act of 1980. Hearings on S 2284 Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.k, 6588, The National Intelli-
gence Act of 1980: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978.
Hearings on S 2525 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
45 For an illustration of the type of FBI counterintelligence investigation of political
activities in the United States on behalf of foreign powers that may raise first amendment
issues, see the declassified version of the report prepared by the FBI Intelligence Division in
1983 on "Soviet Active Measures Relating to the U.S. Peace Movement." 129 CONG. REC.
H1793-97 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983). The FBI submitted this report to the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
46 Set J. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS
(1978). One historian warns against reform that is merely an "exercise in legal formalism." J.
GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 220-27 (198 1). Kenneth Culp Davis has
suggested that legal thinking is often too "focused on the formality of law (words in statutes
and in case law) and give[s] insufficient emphasis to the reality of law (what enforcement
officers do in fact)." K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 69 (1975).
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A. Pre-1976 Internal Security Policies
Before the Levi guidelines, the FBI Intelligence Division conducted
internal security investigations of "subversive activities," as well as for-
eign counterintelligence investigations of hostile intelligence agents and
international terrorists. Although internal security investigations some-
times led to criminal prosecutions for acts of violence, their scope and
purposes were broader. Through the mid-1970s, FBI internal security
investigations emphasized collection of extensive political intelligence on
organizations and individuals espousing revolutionary, racist, or other-
wise "extremist" ideological viewpoints.4 7 Before World War II, Presi-
dent Roosevelt asked FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to gather
intelligence about the domestic political influence of communist and fas-
cist groups, and subsequent presidents maintained this assignment.48
Congress reinforced the FBI's internal security mandate with legislation
such as the Smith Act of 194049 and the Voorhis Act,50 which punished
those who advocated violent overthrow of the government, and the In-
ternal Security Act of 1950,5I which required registration of Communist
groups and their members and provided for detention of "dangerous"
individuals in a national emergency.
During the 1960s the FBI widened the scope of its internal security
investigations to include investigations of the civil rights and antiwar
movements. These investigations were aimed at gathering information
47 SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE AcTivrTms, FINAL REPORT, BOOK III, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF
REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE AcTIvrriEs AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 755,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 373-558 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CHURCH COMM. STAFF REPORTS];
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY BY THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, FBI DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE OPERA-
TIONS-THEIR PURPOSE AND SCOPE: ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE RESOLvED (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1976 GAO REPORT].
48 Director Webster has summarized that function:
Beginning with the pre-World War II mobilization, the President directed the
FBI to keep track of "subversive" and "fifth column" groups in this country.
This carried forward into the cold war era and concentrated primarily on
long-established Marxist, Leninist, and Trotskyite groups. Because they were,
in large part, political organizations, they were relatively easy to penetrate
and monitor. They often had a formal organizational structure, sometimes
with national, State, and local chapters. They selected identifiable officers,
accepted new members readily, held open meetings, and prepared official
publications. The typical investigation consisted primarily of monitoring the
activities of these groups, identifying their members and reading their
publications.
1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 10 (testimony of William H. Webster, Director, FBI).
49 Smith Act of 1940, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982).
50 Voorhis Anti-Propaganda Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (1982).
51 Internal Security Act of 1950, (Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987) (1950) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the relationship of these
statutes to FBI intelligence investigations, see CHURCH COMM. STAFF REPORTS, supra note
47, at 410-20, 427-28, 442-47.
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on Communist or "extremist" influence in the groups and acquiring ad-
vance knowledge of any disruptive demonstrations or acts of violence.
The FBI went beyond investigation and employed so-called COINTEL-
PRO operations to disrupt groups and discredit or harass individuals.
When Attorney General William Saxbe released a public report on
COINTELPRO in 1974, he described some of these tactics as "abhor-
rent in a free society." '52
The Levi guidelines and accompanying administrative reforms
abandoned the FBI's previous internal security policies. 53 In 1976 Di-
rector Clarence M. Kelley changed the framework of domestic security
investigations by treating investigation of domestic terrorism as a matter
of criminal law enforcement, rather than as a political intelligence mat-
ter. He shifted supervision of domestic terrorism investigations from the
FBI's Intelligence Division to its Criminal Investigative Division. Inter-
national terrorist groups, however, were to be investigated under the
classified foreign counterintelligence guidelines. The FBI Intelligence
Division devoted its attention to investigating hostile foreign intelligence
operations, including Soviet efforts to influence domestic politics
through the Communist Party and its front organizations. 54
B. The Criminal Intelligence Concept
After Director Webster took office in 1978, the term "criminal intel-
ligence" became associated with FBI investigations of criminal enter-
prises engaged in racketeering or terrorist activities. The 1980 Civiletti
guidelines distinguished between general crimes investigations "under-
taken to detect, prevent and prosecute specific violations of federal law"
and two types of "criminal intelligence investigations"-those "under-
taken to obtain information concerning enterprises which are engaged
in racketeering activities involving violence, extortion or public corrup-
tion" and those "undertaken for the purpose of obtaining information
on activities that threaten the national security;" the Civiletti guidelines
stated that these provisions were "consistent with the requirements of
the proposed FBI Charter Act but do not depend upon passage of the
Act for their effectiveness." '55
Attorney General Civiletti's decision to retain the Levi guidelines,
however, was not fully consistent with the FBI charter bill, which used
52 CHURCH COMM. STAFF REPORTS, supra note 47, at 73.
53 Director Webster has stated that "the thrust of the Levi Guidelines was to force a
reexamination of our domestic security investigations-concentrating on conduct rather than
ideology." 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 48, at 10 (testimony of William H. Webster, Direc-
tor, FBI).
54 For a more detailed account of the reorganization of FBI intelligence functions in
1976 and the impact of the Levi guidelines, see J. ELLIFF, THE REFORM OF FBI INTELLI-
GENCE OPERATIONS (1979).
55 Civiletti Guidelines, supra note 3, Introduction.
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the enterprise concept to define the authority for FBI domestic security
investigations. The authoritative commentary on the charter bill ex-
plained the differences between general crimes investigations and inves-
tigations of racketeering or terrorist enterprises:
As a practical matter, an investigation of a completed criminal act is
normally confined to determining who committed that act and with
securing evidence to establish the elements of the particular crime. It
is, in this respect, self-defining. An investigation of an ongoing crimi-
nal enterprise must determine the size and composition of the group
involved, its geographic dimensions, its past acts and intended crimi-
nal goals, and its capacity for harm. While a standard criminal inves-
tigation terminates with the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute,
the investigation of a criminal enterprise does not necessarily end,
even though one or more of the participants may have been
prosecuted.
In addition, the organization provides life and continuity of oper-
ation that are not normally found in regular criminal activity. As a
consequence, these investigations may continue for several years. In
addition, as Justice Powell noted, the focus of such investigations
"may be less precise than that directed against more conventional
types of crime." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 322 (1972). Unlike the usual criminal case, there may be no com-
pleted offense to provide a framework for the investigation.
It often requires the fitting together of bits and pieces of informa-
tion, many meaningless by themselves, to ascertain if there is a mosaic
of criminal activity. For this reason, the investigation is broader and
less discriminate than usual, involving "the interrelation of various
sources and types of information." [Id. ]
At the same time, it is recognized that group investigations pres-
ent special problems, particularly where they deal with politically mo-
tivated acts. As Justice Powell pointed out, "There is often a
convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not found in
cases of 'ordinary' crime." [Id ] Thus, special care must be exercised
in sorting out protected activities from those which may lead to vio-
lence or serious disruption of society. As a consequence, the charter
establishes special safeguards for group investigations of special sensi-
tivity, including tighter management controls and higher levels of
review. 5 6
The Smith guidelines adopted a terrorist enterprise concept similar to
the FBI charter proposal. The description of criminal intelligence inves-
tigations in the Smith guidelines is virtually the same as the above
quoted commentary.57
56 S. 1612, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 21,513 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FBI
Charter Commentary].
57 Smith Guidelines, supira note 1, § III. The guidelines add the statement, "Members of
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C. Terrorist Enterprise Investigations
Terrorist enterprise investigations, treated as criminal rather than
political intelligence gathering under the Smith guidelines, are confined
to matters of legitimate "law enforcement interest" and must "be based
on a reasonable factual predicate and. . . have a valid law enforcement
purpose."58 Their "immediate purpose .. .is to obtain information
concerning the nature and structure of the enterprise. . . with a view to
the longer range objective of detection, prevention, and prosecution of
the criminal activities of the enterprise.1 59 They must "be terminated
when all logical leads have been exhausted and no legitimate law en-
forcement interest justifies their continuance." 60 The guidance for use of
investigative techniques stresses law enforcement considerations:
"Whether a highly intrusive technique should be used depends on the
seriousness of the crime and the strength of the information indicating
the existence of crime."161
The Smith guidelines completed the transition from pre-1976 inter-
nal security investigations of domestic subversion to policies that inte-
grate domestic security-terrorism investigations with federal criminal
law enforcement. Although the Levi guidelines triggered this change in
policy, their language retained provisions reflecting an internal security
approach. The Levi guidelines authorized domestic security
investigations
to ascertain information on the activities of individuals, or the activi-
ties of groups, which involve or will involve the use of force or violence
and which involve or will involve the violation of federal law, for the
purpose of:
(1) overthrowing the government of the United States or the govern-
ment of a State;
(2) substantially interfering, in the United States, with the activities
of a foreign government or its authorized representatives;
(3) substantially impairing for the purpose of influencing U.S. gov-
ernment policies or decisions:
(a) the functioning of the government of the United States;
groups or organizations acting in concert to violate the law present a grave threat to society."
Id
58 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § I. Similar language in the Civiletti guidelines
provided:
A key principle. . . is that individuals and organizations should be free from
law enforcement scrutiny that is undertaken without a valid factual predicate
and without a valid law enforcement purpose. Such investigative activity
poses the risk of undue injury to reputation and increases the chance that an
investigative target may be prosecuted for improper reasons.
Civiletti Guidelines, supra note 3, Introduction. "[A]n investigation should be promptly ter-
minated upon completion of all reasonable and logical investigative steps." Id § I.A.
59 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § III.A.3.
60 Id § I.
61 Id § IV.A.
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(b) the functioning of the government of a State; or
(c) interstate commerce.
(4) depriving persons of their civil rights under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.62
The outdated reference to "overthrowing the government," and the au-
thority to investigate activities that "will involve the use of force or vio-
lence" would have permitted interpretations of the Levi guidelines
based on earlier internal security policies. Moreover, the Levi guidelines
failed to discuss the specific purposes or scope of domestic security inves-
tigations or their relationship to law enforcement. The Smith guide-
lines, on the other hand, make clear that the FBI's domestic security role
is criminal law enforcement against terrorist violence and not the collec-
tion of political intelligence about the expression of unorthodox
opinions.
The new guidelines were also designed to overcome the reluctance
of some FBI agents to open domestic security investigations in cases that
"seemed rather clearly to meet the standards of the old guidelines."
This reluctance made it "difficult to develop and maintain ongoing in-
telligence" about a criminal enterprise after prosecution of a specific
crime. From a law enforcement perspective, therefore, the purpose of
the Smith guidelines was "to reaffirm the need for criminal intelligence
in domestic security/terrorism matters" and, in the process, "to simplify
the rules, to clarify ambiguities and to minimize the differences in the
various guidelines governing our criminal investigations so that Agents
could apply the rules as the needs of the situation require. '63
III
FULL DOMESTIC SECURITY-TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS
The Smith guidelines made few changes in the threshold standards
for opening full domestic security-terrorism investigations. The princi-
pal differences from the Levi guidelines were the use of language drawn
from the Civiletti criminal investigative guidelines and the addition of
provisions to clear up ambiguities. The term "full investigation" refers
to an investigation that may last for a year before review and may em-
ploy the full range of investigative techniques, subject to constitutional
and statutory restrictions and any other applicable guidelines, such as
those dealing with undercover operations. The Smith guidelines also
provide for preliminary inquiries, which are shorter and less intrusive
62 Levi Guidelines, supra note 2, § I.A.
63 Hearing on Attomry General's Guidelines For Domestic Securi Investigations (Smith Guidelines)
Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism ofthe Senate Comm. on theJudiciaV, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., app., exhibit D, at 76 (1983) (Testimony by William H. Webster, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the House
Committee on the Judiciary concerning Domestic Security Investigation Guidelines on April





The Levi guidelines provided the following criteria for opening a
full domestic security investigation:
Full investigations must be authorized by FBI Headquarters. They
may only be authorized on the basis of specific and articulable facts
giving reason to believe that an individual or a group is or may be
engaged in activities which involve or will involve the use of force or
violence and which involve or will involve the violation of federal law
for one or more of the purposes enumerated in IA(1)-IA(4). The fol-
lowing factors must be considered in determining whether a full inves-
tigation should be undertaken:
(1) the magnitude of the threatened harm;
(2) the likelihood it will occur;
(3) the immediacy of the threat; and
(4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by a full
investigation. 65
The four enumerated purposes were set forth at the beginning of the
Levi guidelines. 66 The Smith guidelines provide that a full domestic
security-terrorism investigation "may be authorized by the Director or
designated Assistant Director upon a written recommendation setting
forth the facts or circumstances reasonably indicating the existence of an
enterprise as described in this subsection. ' 67 The threshold standard
containing this description states:
A domestic security/terrorism investigation may be initiated when the
facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons
are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or
social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or
violence and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States.
The standard of "reasonable indication" is identical to that governing
the initiation of a general crimes investigation under Part II. In deter-
mining whether an investigation should be conducted, the FBI shall
consider all of the circumstances including: (1) the magnitude of the
threatened harm; (2) the likelihood it will occur; (3) the immediacy of
the threat; and (4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by
64 See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
65 Levi Guidelines, supra note 2, § I (emphasis added). The italicized words are omitted
in most published texts of the guidelines due to a typographical error in the copy originally
released in 1976 by the Department of Justice. The accurate text has been used for internal
FBI manual purposes, and the Justice Department explained the discrepancy at a Senate
Judiciary Committee hearing in 1978. FBI Statutoty Charter. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
theJudicia, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 94-95 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate Hearings].
66 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.




Investigations are to be "concerned with the investigation of entire en-
terprises, rather than individual participants and specific criminal
acts."'69 This is the same approach taken in the charter bill and the
guidelines for racketeering investigations. The differences between the
political or social goals of criminal violence 70 and the purposes for crimi-
nal violence enumerated in the Levi guidelines do not mean that the
scope of investigations under the Smith guidelines is wider; the broadest
purpose in the Levi guidelines was to investigate all individuals and
groups that may be engaged in activities that involve or will involve the
use of force or violence in violation of federal law for the purpose of
"depriving persons of their civil rights."'T
The most obvious change is the Smith guidelines' use of the "rea-
sonable indication" standard instead of the "specific and articulable
facts" formula of the Levi guidelines. 72 The "reasonable indication"
standard was originally proposed in the FBI charter bill, where it was
used for all three types of FBI law enforcement investigations-general
crimes, racketeering enterprise, and terrorist enterprise. 73 The section
on general crimes investigations in the Smith guidelines, which is re-
tained almost verbatim from the Civiletti guidelines, provides:
The standard of "reasonable indication" is substantially lower
than probable cause. In determining whether there is reasonable indi-
cation of a federal criminal violation, a Special Agent may take into
account any facts or circumstances that a prudent investigator would
consider. However, the standard does require specific facts or circum-
stances indicating a past, current, or impending violation. There
must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a
mere hunch is insufficient. 74
After issuance of the Smith guidelines, the Justice Department stated
that the threshold requirement was "not expressed . . . in terms of a
'reasonable suspicion' [or] in terms of probabilities or degrees of cer-
tainty that individuals or organizations are engaged or have engaged in
crime."175 According to the Justice Department, the standard requires
"a reasonable indication that the enterprise to be investigated is organ-
ized for the purpose of achieving its ends through criminal activity. ' 76
68 Id § III.B.l.a.
69 Id § III.B.
70 See id. § III.B.
71 Levi Guidelines, supra note 2, § I.A.4.
72 Attorney General Levi borrowed the "specific and articulable facts" formula from the
Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
73 FBI Charter Bill, supra note 4, § 533(b).
74 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § II.C.1; cf. Civiletti Guidelines, supra note 3, § I.
75 Letter from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs,




B. Investigation Before Crimes Occur
The most serious ambiguity in the Smith guidelines, as in the Levi
guidelines before them, involves the standard for opening an investiga-
tion before any crime occurs. The guidelines leave unclear whether
facts or circumstances meeting the terrorist enterprise standard would
also constitute evidence of a criminal conspiracy. The general crimes
investigation section of the guidelines addresses this issue directly:
Where a criminal act may be committed in the future, prepara-
tion for that act can, of course, amount to a current criminal violation
under the conspiracy or attempt provisions of federal criminal law, if
there are present the requisite agreement and overt act, or substantial
steps toward completion of the criminal act and intention to complete
the act. With respect to criminal activity that may occur in the future
but does not yet involve a current criminal conspiracy or attempt,
particular care is necessary to assure that there exist facts and circum-
stances amounting to a reasonable indication that a crime will
occur.
7 7
The guidelines for the two types of criminal intelligence investigations
differ on this point. The racketeering enterprise threshold requires a
reasonable indication "that two or more persons are engaged in a continu-
ing course of conduct for the purpose of obtaining monetary or commercial
gains or profits wholly or in part through racketeering activity. ' 78 The
domestic security-terrorism guidelines refer to persons engaged "in an
enterprise" rather than "in a continuing course of conduct."
The reason for this difference is suggested by the commentary on
the FBI ,charter bill, which used the term "continuing enterprise" for
both racketeering and terrorist enterprise investigations. Despite the
common terminology in the bill, the commentary referred to "a group
engaged in racketeering activities," as contrasted with a group having
"a serious intent to engage in terrorist activities." The commentary of-
fered the following explanation for initiating an investigation when "no
terrorist act has occurred":
Obviously, a prior record of violence is an important factor in deter-
mining whether an investigation for future crimes is warranted. But
the government may also look to other factors such as informant in-
formation, the stockpiling of weapons, an announced intent to engage
in violence, and the full range of considerations that historically have
been available to law enforcement officers.
. . .If the investigation begins prematurely, it may deal with
marginal or speculative threats to society or with entirely innocent
conduct. If commenced too late, it becomes difficult if not impossible
77 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § II.C.2; f Civiletti Guidelines, supra note 3, § I.C.2.
78 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § III.A.2.b (emphasis added).
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to gather information that is needed for the government to respond
effectively.
. . . The better approach is to recognize that the government
must proceed with the utmost caution in such cases and perhaps to
require a stronger factual basis for investigation if the enterprise has
not previously engaged in terrorist crimes. 79
This explanation and the Smith guidelines presume that politically mo-
tivated terrorist crimes, such as bombings or kidnappings, require more
authority for investigation before a crime occurs than is the case with
other offenses.
The question remains, however, whether criminal intelligence in-
vestigations rather than general crimes investigations are needed in such
cases. The FBI may initiate a general crimes investigation before a
crime occurs, when "facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that a
federal crime . . . will be committed"; and the investigation "may be
conducted to prevent. . . such criminal activity." 80 There is little justi-
fication for opening a criminal intelligence investigation if a more nar-
rowly focused general crimes investigation can serve the preventive
function by looking for confirmation that a crime is likely to take place.
Perhaps the reason for authorizing criminal intelligence investigations of
potential terrorist groups that have not yet committed crimes is that the
word "will" in the general crimes guidelines suggests that "a greater
likelihood of criminal activity is necessary to support such investigation"
of future crimes.8'
C. Scope and Duration of Investigations
Criminal intelligence investigations are more flexible than general
crimes investigations because they permit the FBI to open cases before
crimes occur and because they allow for investigations that are wider in
scope and longer in duration. The Smith guidelines explain the need for
this flexibility in the investigation of "an ongoing criminal enterprise"
because the organization under investigation has "a life and continuity
of operation not normally found in a regular criminal activity. '8 2 In
cases where no crime has yet been committed, however, it is unclear
whether the broad scope and long duration of a domestic security-ter-
rorist investigation are justified.
In language similar to the racketeering enterprise provisions, the
Smith guidelines for the scope of domestic security-terrorism investiga-
tions provide:
79 FBI Charter Commentary, supra note 56, at 21,513.
80 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § I.C.(1).
81 FBI Charter Commentary, supra note 56, at 21,513.
82 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § III.
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A domestic security/terrorism investigation initiated under these
guideines may collect such information as:
(i) the members of the enterprise and other persons likely to be
knowingly acting in furtherance of its criminal objectives, pro-
vided that the information concerns such persons' activities on
behalf or in furtherance of the enterprise;
(ii) the finances of the enterprise;
(iii) the geographical dimensions of the enterprise; and
(iv) past and future activities and goals of the enterprise.8 3
This wide scope for collection of criminal intelligence applies if a group
has been connected to acts of terrorist violence. In that case all activities
and goals of the enterprise may be relevant to a criminal intelligence
assessment of how to detect and prevent the crimes to which the group is
linked. When it is probable that an individual is aiding and abetting a
group's terrorist crimes, it may be useful to monitor that individual's
activities in furtherance of both the legal and illegal goals of the group.
This type of criminal intelligence may produce information about law-
ful political advocacy and peaceful protest demonstrations. The FBI,
however, may use such information only for making law enforcement
decisions concerning the detection, prevention, and prosecution of vio-
lent crimes. The guidelines do not suggest a need for such wide-ranging
information when no crime has yet occurred.
Another facet of the extended scope of a terrorist enterprise investi-
gation is its ability "to cross organizational lines . . . without regard to
what [a] particular group or element of [a] group might call itself."184
According to Director Webster, it no longer will be necessary "to pro-
vide a separate justification for investigation of so-called 'front groups' if
there is any information indicating that the members of such groups are
also knowing members of the criminal enterprise. '8 5 Webster's reference
to "front groups" is somewhat misleading in that the guidelines do not
permit investigation of an entire group merely because some of its mem-
bers are part of a terrorist enterprise.8 6
The duration of a domestic security-terrorism investigation de-
83 Id
84 1982 Senate Heaning, supra note 43, at 11 (testimony of William H. Webster, Director,
FBI).
85 Id
86 Assistant Attorney General Jensen explained that the enterprise concept
will permit agents to address as one criminal enterprise all those persons who
knowingly provide support to a group's criminal objectives, whether or not
they are formal members of the "group" which may actually engage in crimi-
nal violence. This concept will also permit FBI agents to focus upon violent
factions of a larger organization without placing the entire organization
under investigation.
Statement of D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
House of Representatives, Concerning the Attorney General's Guidelines on Domestic Secur-
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pends on a group's history of violent acts. To clarify an ambiguity in the
Levi guidelines, Attorney General Smith expressly permitted investiga-
tions to continue even if a violent group has not been active for some
time:
Each investigation should be reviewed at least annually to insure that
the threshold standard is satisfied and that continued allocation of
investigative resources is warranted. In some cases, the enterprise may
meet the threshold standard but be temporarily inactive in the sense
that it has not engaged in recent acts of violence, nor is there any
immediate threat of harm-yet the composition, goals and prior his-
tory of the group suggests [sic] the need for continuing federal interest.
Under those circumstances, the investigation may be continued but
reasonable efforts should be made to limit the coverage to information
which might indicate a change in the status or criminal objectives of
the enterprise. 87
Director Webster recommended this change in the Levi guidelines to
make clear to FBI personnel that they need not terminate a full investi-
gation merely because a group remains passive for a year. 8 This provi-
sion does not indicate intent to allow for continuance of an investigation
initiated in the absence of a prior crime.
Limitations on the scope of criminal intelligence gathering are ap-
propriate not only when a violent group becomes passive, but also when
an enterprise has not yet carried out its violent intentions. In either case
"information which might indicate a change" in the group's criminal
ity/Terrorism Investigations 3 (Apr. 27, 1983) (hearing unpublished) (on file at Cornell Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Jensen House Testimony].
Director Webster's instructions to the field stressed that
persons who provide safehouses, money, weapons or otherwise knowingly sup-
port the criminal activities of the terrorist enterprise can be investigated as
part of the same criminal enterprise. . . . The new approach recognizes that
terrorist groups today have a fluid membership and often lack organizational
structure, yet function as a single enterprise directed toward a common goal.
Airtel from FBI Director D. Webster to All SACs, Re: Attorney General's Guidelines for the
Conduct of Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations 2 (Mar. 17, 1983) (Effective Mar. 21,
1983) (on file at Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Webster Instructions].
87 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § III.B.4.d.
88 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 11-12. Director Webster's instructions to the
field stated:
There has been a tendency in the past to close domestic security investi-
gations and terminate informant coverage when the violent activity of the
group has been dormant for a period of time. If the organization became
active again, it was often a difficult and time-consuming process to redevelop
informant coverage. The new Guidelines permit the FBI to monitor organi-
zations who may be temporarily inactive, but whose prior record or stated
objectives indicate a need for continuing federal interest, so long as the thresh-
old standard for investigation is satisfied. Under those circumstances, the in-
vestigation may be placed in a pending status but informant coverage can be
maintained to the extent necessary to determine whether there is any change
in the criminal objectives of the enterprise.
Webster Instructions, supra note 86, at 4-5.
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objectives should fulfill criminal intelligence requirements. If Justice
Department policy dictates the opening of a criminal intelligence inves-
tigation before terrorist violence occurs, limits on the type of informa-
tion collected in such investigations would reduce the likelihood that the
courts might find impermissible overbreadth.
IV
PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES
In addition to full investigations, the Smith guidelines authorize
preliminary inquiries when facts or circumstances reasonably indicating
criminal activity are not available. 89 The Levi guidelines authorized
limited preliminary domestic security investigations to determine
whether there was a factual basis for opening a full investigation.90 The
new guidelines abolish separate preliminary inquiries for domestic se-
curity purposes. Instead, as in the Civiletti guidelines for general crimes
and racketeering enterprise investigations,91 the Smith guidelines au-
thorize only general crimes preliminary inquiries.
A. Internal Security Inquiries
Elimination of separate preliminary inquiries for domestic security
or criminal intelligence purposes is another sign of the distance between
the Smith guidelines and pre-1976 internal security policies. Before the
adoption of the Levi guidelines, the FBI conducted numerous prelimi-
nary inquiries for domestic intelligence purposes based largely on polit-
ical expression or association. These inquiries contributed to the FBI's
extensive files on individuals and groups at the fringes of domestic polit-
ical life, but provided little valuable law enforcement information. 92
89 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § II.B.
90 Levi Guidelines, supra note 2, § II.C.
91 Civiletti Guidelines, supra note 3, § I.D.
92 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 47, at 138-47. One of the FBI's last statements de-
fending the pre-1976 policy explained the political intelligence rationale for such widespread
inquiries:
The doctrines and objectives of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organizations
and similar groups have provided a basis for the conduct of intelligence inves-
tigations concerning them predicated upon a reasonable belief that govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in collecting information to assess the extent to
which such organizations may contribute to future crises which affect its abil-
ity to function ...
... . Limiting domestic intelligence investigations to preventing force
and violence could restrict the gathering of intelligence information useful for
anticipating threats to national security of a more subtle nature. This is the
case because, in our view, such a limitation would protect from governmental
inquiry those plotting to undermine our institutions during their preliminary
stages of organization and preparation and thus inhibit the development of
an intelligence collage upon which to base meaningful analyses and predic-




Preliminary inquiries played an important part in developing polit-
ical intelligence information prior to 1976. The FBI felt it was "incum-
bent on any intelligence agency to resolve allegations of subversive
activity or extremism made against individuals. . . . [W]here an alle-.
gation is made and we establish no affiliation [with an extremist or sub-
versive organization] or potential dangerousness, we accomplish a
positive result not a negative.193 In some cases, the FBI opened prelimi-
nary inquiries not only in response to allegations, but also as a means of
screening all individuals in a suspect class. For example, the FBI opened
preliminary inquiries about all black student leaders in 1971 to deter-
mine which of them belonged to groups like the Black Panther Party.94
The Levi guidelines restricted the techniques allowed in prelimi-
nary or limited domestic security investigations. Most important, the
FBI could not recruit new informants or place them in groups, although
the guidelines did allow inquiry of existing sources and use of previously
established informants. The Levi guidelines also barred mail covers.95
The overall terms of the Levi guidelines, however, did not necessarily
require a change from the sweeping pre-1976 preliminary inquiry prac-
tices. Inquiries could "be undertaken on the basis of allegations or other
information that an individual or a group [might] be engaged in activi-
ties" that would justify a full investigation. 96 In practice, the interpreta-
tion of this authorization depended on restrictive FBI and Justice
Department policies that sharply reduced the number of domestic secur-
ity investigations and inquiries after 1976.97
B. General Crimes Inquiries
The Smith guidelines conform to post-1976 policies that have
placed exclusive reliance on law enforcement considerations and have
moved away from internal security or political intelligence criteria. The
standards for preliminary inquiries are set forth in the general crimes
guidelines:
On some occasions the FBI may receive information or an allega-
tion not warranting a full investigation-because there is not yet a
"reasonable indication" of criminal activities--but whose responsible
handling requires some further scrutiny beyond the prompt and ex-
tremely limited checking out of initial leads. In such circumstances,
though the factual predicate for an investigation has not been met,
the FBI may initiate an "inquiry" involving some measured review,
93 Id at 214.
94 CHURCH COMM. STAFF REPORTS, supra note 47, at 527.
95 Levi Guidelines, supra note 2, § II.G.
96 Id § II.C.
97 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE




contact, or observation activities in response to the allegation or infor-
mation indicating the possibility of criminal activity.
This authority to conduct inquiries short of a full investigation
allows the government to respond in a measured way to ambiguous or
incomplete information and to do so with as little intrusion as the
needs of the situation permit. This is especially important in such
areas as white-collar crime where no complainant is involved or when
an allegation or information is received from a source of unknown
reliability. It is contemplated that such inquiries would be of short
duration and be confined solely to obtaining the information neces-
sary to make an informed judgment as to whether a full investigation
is warranted. 98
The only change from the Civiletti general crimes guidelines is to
lengthen the initial duration from sixty to ninety days, matching the
initial length under the Levi guidelines. Thereafter, FBI Headquarters
may grant thirty-day extensions based on "a written request and state-
ment of reasons why further investigative steps are warranted when
there is no 'reasonable indication' of criminal activity." 99
The reliance that the Smith guidelines place on general crimes in-
quiries resolves an FBI concern that the Levi guidelines had prohibited
the recruitment of new informants in preliminary domestic security in-
vestigations.10 0 The Smith guidelines place no similar restriction on pre-
liminary general crimes inquiries. The general guidance for use of
techniques provides:
Before employing an investigative technique in an inquiry, the
FBI should consider whether the information could be obtained in a
timely and effective way by less intrusive means. Some of the factors
to be considered in judging intrusiveness are adverse consequences to
an individual's privacy interests and avoidable damage to his reputa-
tion. Whether an intrusive technique should be used in an inquiry
depends on the seriousness of the possible crime and the strength of
the information indicating the possible existence of the crime. How-
ever, the techniques used in an inquiry should generally be less intru-
sive than those employed in a full investigation. It is recognized that
choice of technique is a matter of judgment. 101
After listing techniques, such as limited interviews and photographic
surveillance, that may be used without prior authorization from a super-
visory agent, the guidelines provide: "Where a technique is highly in-
trusive, a supervisory agent shall approve its use in the inquiry stage
only in compelling circumstances and when other investigative means
98 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § II.B. 1.
99 Id § II.B.3.
100 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 9 (testimony of William H. Webster, Director,
FBI).
101 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § II.B.4.
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are not likely to be successful."'10 2 According to Director Webster, the
term "highly intrusive" includes pen registers, consensual monitoring of
telephone conversations, the use of locator devices, and the use of an
informant "in a manner that involves a significant intrusion into one's
private affairs." The Director has explained that the guidelines do not
define the term "highly intrusive," "because the intrusiveness of a par-
ticular technique will often depend on the manner and circumstances in
which it is employed." In addition to the guidelines' restrictive lan-
guage on use of intrusive techniques, Director Webster has stated that a
general crimes inquiry "focuses on specific persons and offenses and is
directed primarily toward determining whether a full criminal investi-
gation is warranted" and that this framework "confines our collection
efforts largely to evidence that would establish the elements of a
crime."1 03
A change in the Smith guidelines on investigative techniques also
limits the discretion to infiltrate organizations as part of a preliminary
inquiry. The Civiletti guidelines did not specifically limit this technique
in general crimes inquiries. The Smith guidelines added a new require-
ment: "Undisclosed participation in the activities of an organization by
an undercover employee or cooperating private individual in a manner
that may influence the exercise of rights protected by the First Amend-
ment must be approved by FBIHQ, with notification to Department of
Justice."' 10 4 This provision established a uniform headquarters approval
requirement whenever new or established informants infiltrate groups in
either a preliminary inquiry or a full investigation. Infiltrating groups
in a preliminary inquiry was a sensitive issue in the FBI charter bill.
Even though the bill placed no express limit on such techniques in in-
quiries, the commentary stated that "infiltration of groups by new
sources or by undercover Agents" would not be permitted in an inquiry
conducted pursuant to the authority for terrorist enterprise investiga-
tions.10 5 Whether the Smith guidelines resolve this issue may depend on
whether general crimes inquiries in practice turn out to be, as Director
Webster has described, "more limited in scope and purpose than the
preliminary investigation formerly authorized under the [Levi]
Guidelines." 0 6
102 Id § II.B.6.
103 Webster House Testimony, supra note 62, at 76-77. Instructions to FBI field offices
describe "compelling circumstances" as "circumstances requiring the use of such techniques
to determine the validity of information or allegations concerning possible serious criminal
activity such as a threat to life or substantial property interests, the destruction or alteration
of evidence, or the serious impairment or hindrance of an investigation." Webster Instruc-
tions, supra note 86, at 3.
104 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § IV.B.3.
105 FBI Charter Commentary, supra note 56, at 25,513.




INVESTIGATIONS BASED ON ADVOCACY
The provision in the Smith guidelines authorizing FBI investiga-
tions on the basis of statements advocating criminal activity has
prompted considerable controversy. The guidelines provide:
In its efforts to anticipate or prevent crime, the FBI must at times
initiate investigations in advance of criminal conduct. It is important
that such investigations not be based solely on activities protected by
the First Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. When, how-
ever, statements advocate criminal activity or indicate an apparent
intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of violence, an investiga-
tion under these Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent,
from the circumstances or the context in which the statements are
made, that there is no prospect of harm.
0 7
In comparison, the Levi guidelines did not specifically address the ques-
tion of investigation based on statements alone, although investigations
were to be "designed and conducted so as not to limit the full exercise of
rights protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States."' 10 8
In the view of one federal court, the new authorization is too broad.
Shortly after issuance of the Smith guidelines, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois ruled 0 9 that the new guidelines con-
flicted with a settlement reached in earlier litigation that established
standards for FBI domestic security investigations in Chicago. 110 The
settlement had incorporated the Levi guidelines and stated that the FBI
" 'shall not conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment.' "111 Citing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the district court interpreted "activities
protected by the First Amendment" as including advocacy that is not
" 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . .
likely to incite or produce such action.' "112 Concluding that the provi-
sion in the new guidelines authorizing investigation when "statements
advocate criminal activity" permitted investigations that may not meet
the Brandenburg test,' 1 3 the court enjoined implementation of the Smith
guidelines within Chicago. The district court based its ruling on the
terms of the 1981 settlement, not on a determination that the Smith
guidelines were unconstitutional. 14 The court expressed no opinion on
107 Smith Guidelines, supra note I, § I.
108 Levi Guidelines, supra note 2, § II.B.
109 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
110 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
111 561 F. Supp. at 583 (appendix).
112 561 F. Supp. at 578 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
113 Id at 578-79.
114 Id at 579.
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the merits of the constitutional argument that an activity protected
from criminal sanctions may not be protected from the "more limited"
power to investigate." 5 Moreover, instead of focusing on interpreta-
tions of previous FBI guidelines, especially as discussed in testimony on
the charter bill, or the official explanations of the intent of the Smith
guidelines, the district court relied on the record of the settlement,
which it found had incorporated the Brandenburg standard."16
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court but lifted the injunction as
unnecessary in the absence of "substantial and imminent danger of ac-
tion by the FBI violating the Brandenburg principle as embodied in the
consent decree."' 1 7 A dissenting opinion warned that the FBI might be
foreclosed from initiating less intrusive preliminary inquiries on the ba-
sis of statements alone.118 However, the majority opinion took special
note of the distinction made in both the consent decree and the Smith
guidelines between "preliminary inquiries" and "investigations." The
consent decree applied the Brandenburg principle only to
"investigations."' 1 9
The following provision in the 1980 Civiletti guidelines closely par-
alleled the language of the Chicago settlement and was included in the
FBI charter bill:
No investigation may be based solely on the lawful expression of reli-
gious or political views by an individual or group, the lawful exercise
of the right to peaceably assemble and to petition the Government, or
the lawful exercise of any other right secured by the Constitution or
by the laws of the United States.' 20
Testimony at hearings on the FBI charter discussed the provision's in-
tended meaning. One FBI official stated: "We cannot start an investi-
gation based on rhetoric. . . .We need some sort of actual activity."1 2'
Another explained:
We don't mean to suggest that statements [advocating terrorist
violence] are entirely irrelevant to the Bureau's interest. If there is
any activity that is now tied to that statement, when taken with other
circumstances, it can provide an adequate basis for investigation.
What we are trying to do. . .is distinguish between simple ex-
pression of ideology and statements or conduct that pose a threat.
115 Id
116 Id
117 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Nos. 83-1853, 83-1854, slip op. at 10
(7th Cir. Feb. 23, 1984).
118 Id at 16.
119 Id at3.
120 Civiletti Guidelines, supra note 3, § I.A.
121 FBI Charter Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1612 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciag, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 57 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FBI Charter Hearings].
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That is very difficult to do . .. .122
Testimony also indicated that the FBI would have to remain flexible in
its administration of preliminary inquiries because there is admittedly
an uncertain
line between political rhetoric and a statement that expresses an un-
ambiguous intention to commit a crime. As that statement, even if it
is public, becomes more specific, and would give some indication that
the persons, in fact, intend to commit a particular crime, it may well
provide the basis certainly for a preliminary inquiry.' 23
A Justice Department official tried to clarify the difference between
rhetoric and activity by explaining that "activity" could mean "a meet-
ing was held where there were [sic] serious discussion about blowing
something up or someone was recruited to the group who had demoli-
tion background. . .[or] there was a communication, a letter written to
somebody that was looking toward violence and criminal terrorist
acts."124
The charter testimony illustrates the difficulty of interpreting a ban
against investigations based solely on the exercise of first amendment
rights. The Smith guidelines compounded that difficulty by emphasiz-
ing that statements advocating criminal activity may justify an investi-
gation unless there is clearly "no prospect of harm."' 25 Under this
provision, the FBI need not find "an apparent intent to engage in
crime"' 126 in order to proceed with an investigation so long as the cir-
cumstances or context indicate the possibility of a crime in the future.
Apparently the FBI can conduct on this basis full criminal intelligence
investigations, not just preliminary inquiries or general crimes investiga-
tions of specific potential offenses. A literal reading of the provision on
advocacy, however, would conflict with the overall thrust of the Smith
guidelines by allowing a return to domestic political intelligence investi-
gations based on ideology or rhetoric.
The FBI and the Justice Department have sought to allay this con-
cern. Director Webster's implementing directive emphasized the need
for "a credible threat of harm" and the use of preliminary inquiries "[t]o
the extent possible."' 27 In his testimony before the House Subcommit-
tee on Constitutional Rights, Assistant Attorney General Jensen stated:
122 Id at 58.
123 Id at 82.
124 Id at 113. Several Senators expressed the view that the FBI should investigate do-
mestic "subversive" groups such as the Socialist Workers Party because of their advocacy of
revolutionary doctrines. Id at 69-70. FBI officials testified that the charter would not permit
investigations based on "abstract ideology" or "such nebulous terms as. .. whether or not
one is subversive." Id at 69-70, 90-91.
125 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § I.
126 Id
127 Webster Instructions, supra note 86, at 5.
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We would stress that lawful and peaceful political dissent is not
subject to investigation under the revised guidelines, just as it was not
subject to investigation under the prior guidelines. As specific safe-
guards, the revised Guidelines and implementing instructions ex-
pressly prohibit investigations premised solely upon the proper
exercise of First Amendment rights, make it clear that statements
must be viewed in context before any inquiry will be authorized, and
provide that when response is appropriate the normal procedure will
be by way of a preliminary inquiry. However, it is important to make
clear that agents must follow up when confronted with statements
which present a credible threat of criminal activity.' 28
In his testimony before the same Subcommittee, Director Webster ad-
ded that "it would be unwise to foreclose the possibility of a full investi-
gation [based] on advocacy alone, particularly a general crimes
investigation, where statements suggest a serious and immediate pros-
pect of harm."1 29 The implication is that Director Webster will not au-
thorize criminal intelligence investigations solely on the basis of
advocacy, despite the apparent authority to do so under the Smith
guidelines.
The following provision regarding public demonstrations in the sec-
tion on domestic security-terrorism investigations supports the Justice
Department's contention that the Smith guidelines respect constitu-
tional limits: "In the absence of any information indicating planned vio-
lence by a group or enterprise, mere speculation that force or violence
might occur during the course of an otherwise peaceable demonstration
is not sufficient grounds for initiation of an investigation under this sec-
tion."' 30 Alternative authorities for investigating civil disturbances in-
clude the provisions for general crimes investigations' 3 1 and the separate
Levi guidelines for reporting on civil disorders involving a federal inter-
est. 132 These provisions, taken together with the various statements
made by Justice Department officials, indicate a sensitivity to first
amendment rights by those responsible for drafting and implementing
the Smith guidelines. 133
The new guidelines leave open the question of whether the FBI
128 Jensen House Testimony, supra note 85, at 5.
129 Webster House Testimony, supra note 62, at 62.
130 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § III.B I.c.
131 Id § 11.
132 The additional reporting guidelines, which are still in effect, function to strictly limit
FBI investigations. They are reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings On S. 1612 Before the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciag, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-33 (1978).
133 The Smith guidelines do not incorporate recommendations by the Director of the
Secret Service to "maximize the flexibility available to the FBI" so that information could be
obtained about "potentially dangerous groups who have not overtly expressed their inten-
tions," and to "permit the collection of information enabling us to determine that a particular
group poses no danger to our protectees as well as those groups that are a danger." 1982
Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 138.
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may compile publicly available information about political advocacy.
The guidelines state: "Nothing in these Guidelines is intended to pro-
hibit the FBI from collecting and maintaining publicly available infor-
mation consistent with the Privacy Act."' 1 4 This provision raised more
questions than it answered, as indicated by Director Webster's imple-
menting instructions:
FBI Headquarters is currently consulting with the [Department of
Justice] concerning interpretation of this provision in an effort to as-
certain the bounds of this collection effort and to determine adminis-
trative procedures for processing the information collected. All field
offices are instructed to limit their collection of publicly available in-
formation to cases under preliminary inquiry or full investigation in
accordance with the Guidelines. Further instructions with regards to
implementation of this provision will be forthcoming. 135
In prior congressional testimony, Director Webster had discussed the
FBI's "inability to review periodicals or other publications of organiza-
tions that are not under investigation."' 36 Because the Privacy Act
"prohibits agencies from maintaining records on how one exercises first
amendment rights unless it is in connection with an authorized law en-
forcement activity," the FBI "cannot collect that information unless the
group is under active investigation." Although he said it made "little
sense to deny us information that is available to the general public,"
Director Webster continued to adhere to a strict interpretation of the
Privacy Act. 137
In light of this record, the conclusion that the Smith guidelines con-
flict substantially with the settlement provision prohibiting investiga-
tions in Chicago based solely on activities protected by the first
amendment seems unfounded. 138 Attorney General Smith's announce-
ment of the guidelines stated that "constitutionally-protected advocacy
of unpopular ideas or political dissent alone cannot serve as the basis for
an investigation."' 139 Assistant Attorney General Jensen testified that the
intent of the new guidelines was "to retain the safeguards for lawful and
peaceful political dissent which formed the core of the 1976 Guide-
lines."*40 A review of the guidelines as a whole, in the context of past
134 Smith Guidelines, supra note 1, § I.
135 Webster Instructions, supra note 86, at 5.
136 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at 12 (testimony of William H. Webster, Director,
FBI).
137 Id
138 See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
139 Department of Justice Press Release, March 7, 1983, reprinted in Hearing on Attornty
General's Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations (Smith Guidelines) Before the Subcomm. on Se-
curity and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciaiy, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., app., Exhibit A, at
47 (1983).
140 Jensen House Testimony, supra note 86, at 2.
[Vol. 69:785
FBI GUIDELINES
policies, tends to confirm these statements as accurate reflections of the
overall policy established for FBI domestic security investigations.
VI
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The foregoing analysis of the revised FBI guidelines adopted in
1983 by Attorney General Smith indicates the similarities between the
new guidelines and the 1979 FBI charter proposal. At the hearings held
by the Senate Select Committee established in 1982 to investigate the
ABSCAM case and other FBI undercover policies, Director Webster tes-
tified that he continued to support the concept of a statutory charter for
the FBI and that the FBI was "living by" the terms of the charter bill
introduced in 1979.14 He added that "almost all our internal regula-
tions follow the draft charter as if it were in place."' 42 The most impor-
tant common factor is the continued policy discouraging investigations
for domestic political intelligence purposes. The reaffirmation of the es-
sential elements of Attorney General Levi's policy by two succeeding
administrations with different perspectives suggests the establishment of
a long-term consensus on the FBI's proper role.
There are still those who challenge this consensus and argue for a
resumption of investigations based upon ideology and for purposes other
than criminal law enforcement. 143 Some also would merge foreign
counterintelligence and domestic security investigations and revive the
term "subversion" as the standard for gathering domestic intelli-
gence. ' Perhaps the best answer to their arguments, and the best de-
fense of the post-1976 FBI policies, came from Attorney General Robert
H. Jackson. In an address to a conference of United States Attorneys in
1940, he warned that the concept of subversive activities was "danger-
ous to civil liberty" because there were "no definte [sic] standards to
determine what constitutes a 'subversive activity,' such as we have for
murder or larceny."145 Attorney General Jackson continued:
Activities which seem benevolent and helpful to wage earners, persons
on relief, or those who are disadvantaged in the struggle for existence
may be regarded as "subversive" by those whose property interests
might be burdened or affected thereby. Those who are in office are
apt to regard as "subversive" the activities of any of those who would
141 Law Enforcement Undercover Activities: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Law
Enforcement Undercover Activities of Components of the Department ofJustice, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
1041 (1982).
142 Id
143 G. LEWY, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM: THE NEED FOR REFORM
59-68 (1983).
144 MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP: POLICY MANAGEMENT IN A CONSERVATIVE ADMINIS-
TRATION 930-42 (C. Heatherly ed. 1981).
145 Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 19 (1940).
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bring about a change of administration. Some of our soundest consti-
tutional doctrines were once punished as subversive. We must not
forget that it was not so long ago that both the term "Republican"
and the term "Democrat" were epithets with sinister meaning to de-
note persons of radical tendencies that were "subversive" of the order
of things then dominant. 146
The FBI must maintain its nonpolitical character in order to preserve
public and congressional confidence. This is particularly relevant in the
area of sensitive undercover investigative techniques that may affect the
reputations of individuals and that "can easily inhibit valuable, pro-
tected expression."' 47
A statutory charter for the FBI, covering both its law enforcement
functions and its foreign intelligence and counterintelligence responsibil-
ities, would give added protection against the use of the FBI for domes-
tic political intelligence purposes. The absence of such legislation invites
reliance on claims of "inherent authority" that, as Director Webster ob-
served, were "a major contributor to some of the sad events" associated
with FBI domestic intelligence operations in the past. 148 The extent to
which FBI investigations must come within the scope of statutory au-
thority is unclear, as is the scope of presidential power to order FBI in-
vestigations without statutory authorization. 149 An FBI charter would
help resolve the "continuing debate and controversy about the sources
and extent of the Bureau's investigative authority."' 5 0
The Levi, Civiletti, and Smith guidelines have also demonstrated
that judicial enforcement is not essential to effective formal standards
and procedures for FBI investigations. The Levi guidelines did achieve
the objective of curbing FBI domestic political intelligence investiga-
tions; and the other guidelines largely codified preexisting FBI internal
regulations and practices. Thus, the purpose of a charter need not be to
create enforceable legal rights, but rather to enunciate congressional
support of the nonpolitical nature of the FBI's role. Enforcement would
then come through congressional oversight of compliance rather than
private litigation. This conceptual framework was reflected in the 1979
charter bill and reaffirmed in the recommendations of the Senate Select
Committee that examined FBI undercover operations in 1982.151
146 Id at 19-20.
147 UNDERCOVER AcTIVITIEs REPORT, supra note 5, at 385.
148 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 35.
149 See J. ELLIFF, THE REFORM OF FBI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONs 73-76 (1979); R.
MORGAN, DOMESTIc INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DIssENT IN AMERICA 104-14 (1980).
150 FBI Charter Hearings, supra note 126, at 12.
151 The Select Committee recommended against legislating judicially enforceable restric-
tions on undercover techniques because of a desire not to void criminal convictions on techni-
cal violations, a fear that standards might be diluted to minimize the risk of violations, and a
concern about excessive litigation and undue disclosure of sensitive law enforcement data.
UNDERCOVER ACTIVITIES REPORT, supra note 5, at 396-97.
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Despite wide agreement on the basic principles of an FBI charter,
there are serious obstacles to congressional action. Not the least of these
problems is the natural desire of legislators to regulate the investigative
process in detail.' 52 The experience with the Levi, Civiletti, and Smith
guidelines suggests that such details as the verbal formulas for investiga-
tive thresholds or the precise controls over investigative techniques are
less important than the definition of the FBI's mandate. The consensus
developed under Director Webster may not survive his term in office,
which expires in 1988. That may be the most important reason for us-
ing the Smith guidelines as the basis for renewed consideration of an
FBI charter that gives the force of law to fundamental standards that
foreclose investigations for domestic political intelligence purposes.
152 Former Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, under whom the FBI charter bill was
drafted, has recalled:
After long, complex negotiations, we had presented to the Senate a draft
of that charter. We looked on it as an exhaustive attempt to protect citizens'
liberties from unjustified invasions by FBI agents without sacrificing citizens'
security by shackling agents so tightly they could not perform their missions.
Some senators began to redo sections that had taken months to work out.
Flying back from giving an out-of-town speech, I was asked by a re-
porter on board the plane about the prospects for adoption of the charter.
Here, I thought, was the opportunity to serve notice that the administration
had gone as far as it could. I told the reporter, and he wrote in the next day's
edition of his newspaper, that if the Senate tinkered too much with the propo-
sal, I would rather have no charter at all and let the FBI operate under guide-
lines first issued by my predecessor, Attorney General Edward H. Levi.
G. BELL, TAKING CARE OF THE LAw 35 (1982).
